CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: GOVERNMENT HAS
DUTY TO IMPLEMENT EFFECTIVE
GUIDELINES TO PRESERVE DISCOVERABLE
EVIDENCE
In United States v. Bryant,' the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit held that the duty to disclose evidence is
operative as a duty of preservation upon the Government and that
judicial sanctions will be imposed where disclosure is impossible due
to loss of discoverable evidence, unless the Government attempted in
good faith, through adherence to rigorous and systematic procedures,
to preserve all discoverable evidence amassed during criminal
investigations. Carlton Bryant and William Turner were convicted for
aiding and abetting the sale of heroin to Pope, a government agent,
whose testimony comprised the basis of the case against the
defendants. According to Agent Pope, the sale was negotiated in his
motel room on two separate occasions-once with Bryant and
Johnson, a third accomplice, and on a subsequent occasion with
Turner and Johnson. Other government agents were listening to and
tape recording the conversations from an adjoining room. Defense
counsel unsuccessfully attempted to obtain this tape during the pretrial proceedings. The Assistant United States Attorney informed
defense counsel that a tape had been made but was never turned over
to the prosecution and was apparently lost by the Bureau of Narcotics
and Dangerous Drugs. At a hearing on a defense motion to discover
the tape or, alternatively, to dismiss the indictment, the government
agent responsible for the recording admitted that he had made no
effort to preserve the tape.2 The trial judge denied discovery, and both
defendants were convicted at trial. The court of appeals remanded the
cases for further hearings, instructing the district court to consider the
extent to which negligence or bad faith was involved in the agent's
failure to preserve, the importance of the evidence lost, and the proper
sanction to be imposed.
A defendant's right to discovery in criminal cases was non-existent
1. -. F.2d - (D.C. Cir. 1971), considered together with a companion case, UntiedStates v.

Turner.
2. Apparently, according to agency procedure, Agent Warden would have considered this
tape to be ofevidentiary value only had the narcotics purchaser been an outside informant rather
than a Bureau agent. Id. at
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at common law, 3 and no such right was recognized by the federal
courts- until the addition of rule 16 to the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure.' The only exception to this non-access to material evidence
was in circumstances where the prosecutor acted in such bad faith as
to infringe upon the defendant's constitutional right to due process.
Thus, in Mooney v. Holohan,6 the Supreme Court held that the
defendant was denied due process when the prosecutor contrived a
conviction by deliberately deceiving the court and the jury with
testimony known to be perjured. The Court extended this holding in
subsequent cases, finding a denial of due process where the prosecutor
failed to correct unsolicited perjured testimony;7 where the prosecutor
used perjured testimony relevant only to the defendant's sentence and
not to his guilt; s and where the prosecutor deliberately suppressed
evidence favorable to the defendant. 9 Ultimately, in Brady v.
Maryland,10 the Court held that due process was violated whenever the
prosecution suppressed requested evidence which was favorable to the
defendant's case, irrespective of whether the prosecutor was acting in
good or bad faith. The intentions of the prosecution were immaterial
because the holding was designed to guarantee the accused a fair trial,
not to punish the prosecutor for his misdeeds. Although the Supreme
Court has refused to formulate a precise definition of the extent to
which the prosecution has a duty to disclose requested evidence, 1
Brady at least imposed a general duty not to suppress evidence which
would tend to exculpate the defendant or reduce the severity of the
2
penalty imposed.'
Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure1 3 and the
3. See 2 F. WHARTON, CRIMINAL EvIDENCE § 671 (12th ed. 1955); 6 J. WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE §§ 1859g, 1863 (3d ed. 1940); Grady, Discovery in CriminalCases, 1959 U. ILL. L.F.
827 (1959); Moore, Criminal Discovery, 19 HASTINGS L.J. 865 (1968); Comment, Pre-Trial
Disclosurein CriminalCases,60 YALE L.J. 626 (1951).
4. See, e.g.. United States v. Rosenfeld, 57 F.2d 74,76 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 286 U.S. 556
(1932); United States v. Garsson, 291 F. 646 (S.D.N.Y. 1923); United States v. Violon, 173 F.
501 (S.D.N.Y. 1909). See also Fontana, Discovery in Criminal Cases-A Survey of the
ProposedRule Changes,25 MD. L. REv. 212, 214 (1965); Moore, supra note 3, at 869-70.
5. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 (1946).
6. 294 U.S. 103 (1935).
7. Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959).
8. Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28 (1957).
9. Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213 (1942).
10. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
11. Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66,73-74 (1967).
12. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87-88 (1963).
13. For the pertinent portions of the text of rule 16 see notes 16 and 24 infra.
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Jencks Act 4 have largely precluded the defendant's need to rely upon
constitutional grounds to obtain evidence. 5 Rule 16(a) "6
provides for a
limited right to discovery of the defendant's written or recorded
statements or confessions without any showing of materiality.
Discovery is not mandatory under the rule but rather is within the
discretion of the trial judge. Lower courts and commentators seem to
agree, however, that under rule 16(a) the defendant should be

accorded a presumptive right to discover his own statements or
confessions.' Even assuming a defendant's presumptive right to
discover under rule 16(a) the question remains whether the word
"'statement" as used in 16(a) was intended to encompass a
defendant's statements made during the course of a crime and
contemporaneously recorded by the Government. The Rules Advisory
Committee's Note, emphasizing the broad scope of discovery
intended in the rule, suggests that it should not be restricted to formal
statements of past occurrences but should apply to pre-arrest
statements as well. 19 The ABA Project on Minimum Standards for
Criminal Justice 20 clearly supports this broad approach to discovery
14. 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1964). For a partial text of the Jencks Act, see note 30 infra.
15. Only if the defense fails to bring the item sought within the language of rule 16 or the
Jeneks Act is it necessary to rely upon the due process clause to obtain access to evidence. Such a
situation would be relatively rare where these two statutes are broadly interpreted, as in the
Bryani case. See also United States v. Crisona, 416 F.2d 107, 112-16 (2d Cir. 1969). Probably,
the evidence that one is constitutionally entitled to discover is less than what he can discover
under rule 16 and the Jencks Act. See id.
16. Rule 16(a) provides:
Upon motion of a defendant the court may order the attorney for the government to
permit the defendant to inspect any copy or photograph any relevant (I) written or
recorded statements or confessions made by the defendant, or copies thereof, within the
possession, custody or control of the government, the existence of which if known, or by
the exercise of due diligence may become known, to the attorney for the
government ...
The fact that the showing of materiality, required in rule 16 before the 1966 amendment, was
deleted in the amended rule 16(a), but retained in the amended rule 16(b), supports an inference
that the draftsmen did not intend 16(a) to require a showing of materiality. 4 W. BARRON &A.
HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2033, at 61 (Supp. 1967). See note 34 infra.
17. See notes 16 supra and 24 infra. Both rule 16(a) and 16(b) begin: "Upon motion of a
defendant the court may order...."
18. See United States v. Crisona,416 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1969); United States v. lsa,413 F.2d
244, 248 (7th Cir. 1969); United States v. Projansky, 44 F.R.D.550, 558 (S.D.N.Y. 1968);
United States v. Federman, 41 F.R.D. 339, 341 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). See also 8 J.MooRE,
FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 16.05(l) (2d ed. 1965); 1 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 253, at 500 (1969) [hereinafter cited as WRIGHT]; Moore, supra note 3, at 87 1.
19. See Advisory Committee's Note to FED. R. CRIN,. P. 16(a)(l).
20. ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO DIsCOVERY AND PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL (Tent.
Draft 1969).
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and recommends that the word "statements" be interpreted to
include any utterance of the defendant, whether recorded
surreptitiously or with his knowledge and regardless of to whom the
statement was directed. 2 ' Recent federal decisions in accord with this
interpretation have construed rule 16(a) to allow discovery of
statements unwittingly furnished to the prosection through secret
recording devices, 22 noting that incriminating, secretly recorded
remarks are potentially more damaging than formal confessions of
guilt since the defendant would be unaware that his remarks were
being taped. As a potential alternative to discovery under rule 16(a),
rule 16(b) provides for pre-trial discovery of "books, papers,
2
documents, tangible objects . . . or copies or portions thereof."
Arguably, if a surreptitious recording of a defendant's remarks is not
encompassed by rule 16(a), it would constitute a "tangible object"
within the scope of rule 16(b). 25 The fact that 16(b) specifically
exempts from discovery only "statements made by government
witnesses . . . to agents of the government" indicates that the
defendant's own statements are covered by the rule. In contrast to rule
16(a), however, discovery under 16(b) requires "a showing of
materiality to preparation of [the defendant's] defense and that the
request is reasonable. 2 6 This requirement of materiality and
reasonableness has been liberally construed; anything that the
prosecution intends to use as evidence against the defendant is deemed
material, and therefore a request for its discovery is reasonable. z2 Even
21. Id. at 61-62.
22. United States v. Crisona, 416 F.2d 107, 114-15 (2d Cir. 1969); Davis v. United States,
413 F.2d 1226, 1231 (5th Cir. 1969); United States v. Lubomski, 277 F. Supp. 713,721 (N.D.
Ill. 1967); United States v. lovinelli, 276 F. Supp. 629, 631 (N.D. Il1.1967); United States v.
Leighton, 265 F. Supp. 27, 34 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
23. United States v. Lubomski, 277 F. Supp. 713,721 (N.D. Ill. 1967).
24. Rule 16(b), in full, provides:
Upon motion of a defendant the court may order the attorney for the government to
permit the defendant to inspect and copy or photograph books, papers, documents,
tangible objects, buildings or places, or copies or portions thereof, which are within the
possession, custody or control of the government, upon a showing of materiality to the
preparation of his defense and that the request is reasonable. . . [Tlhis rule does not
authorize the discovery or inspection of. . . statements made by government witnesses
.. to agents of the government. ...
25. See United States v. Fassler, 46 F.R.D. 43 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); United States v. lovinelli,
276 F. Supp. 629, 631-32 (N.D. II1. 1967).
26. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(b). See note 24 supra.
27. See, e.g., United States v. Hrubik, 280 F. Supp. 481 (D. Alaska 1968); United States v.
Reid, 43 F.R.D. 520, 522 (N.D. Il1.1967); cf. United States v. Pilnick, 267 F. Supp. 791, 801
(S.D.N.Y. 1967). See also WRIGHT § 254, at 513; Rezneck, The New FederalRulesof Criminal
Procedure,54 Cso. L.J. 1276, 1279 (1966).
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where the prosecution does not plan to use the sought item against the
defendant, 16(b) may permit its discovery, so long as the defendant
desires to introduce the evidence in his own behalf. 2 Therefore, the
request for discovery is reasonable, and the item sought is material,
when the evidence tends to support the defendant's case or undermine
that of the prosecution.
In Jencks v. United States,29 the Supreme Court held that the
defendant must be allowed to inspect all prior statements by
government witnesses touching upon the subject matter of their
testimony. The Jencks Act, a codification of the Jencks holding,
provides that after the government witness has testified, the defendant
is entitled, upon request, to inspect all prior statements of that witness
insofar as they are relevant to his direct testimony. 3° If the
Government elects not to produce discoverable Jencks statements, the
statute provides that the court shall strike the testimony of the
government's witness from the record. 31 The statute specifically
defines the word "statement" to include tape recordings of a witness'
oral statement to a government agent, 32 and the courts have further
construed this language to require the production of statements made
28. See, e.g., United States v. Aadal, 280 F. Supp. 859 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). See also WRIGHT
§ 254, at 513-14; Rezneck, supra note 27, at 1279.
29. 353 U.S. 657 (1957).
30. 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1964):
(a) In any criminal prosecution brought by the United States, no statement or report in
the possession of the United States which was made by a Government witness. . . to an
agent of the Government shall be the subject of subpena, discovery, or inspection until
said witness has testified on direct examination in the trial ofthe case.
(b) After a witness called by the United States has testified on direct examination, the
court shall, on motion of the defendant, order the United States to produce any statement
.. of the witness in the possession of the United States which relates to the subject
matter as to which the witness has testified.
(d) If the United States elects not to comply with an order of the court. . . to deliver to
the defendant any such statement . . . the court shall strike from the record the
testimony of the witness ....
(e) The term "statement". . means(2) a stenographic, mechanical, electrical, or other recording . . . which is a
substantially verbatim recital of an oral statement made by said witness to an agent of
the Government and recorded contemporaneously with the making of such oral
statement.
31. Id. § 3500(d) (1964).
32. Id. § 3500(e)(2).
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by one government agent to another.3 Unsettled, however, is the
question of whether the Jencks Act extends to tape recordings of
conversations which were recorded by a government agent during the
course of a crime or whether the statute is strictly confined to
statements of past occurrences. The Second Circuit has interpreted
the statute broadly, requiring production of any recording of a
government witness' statement so long as the taping was directed by
government agents as part of their investigative duties.3
The court of appeals in Bryant concluded that the tape recording
of the motel room conversations between the defendants and Agent
Pope should have been preserved for discovery pursuant to both
constitutional and statutory safeguards. Because the tape had been
"lost" by the Government, its content was unknown and the court
could not know what effect, if any, disclosure would have had upon
the defendant's case. Nevertheless, since there was an "unavoidable
possibility that the tape might have been significantly 'favorable' to
the accused,"3a the court extended the due process requirement to the
missing tape. The court reasoned that if the duty to disclose were
invocable only when the contents of the undisclosed evidence was
already known, the duty could be circumvented by destroying the
evidence, rather than refusing to reveal it. Exclusive reliance upon the
constitutional duty of disclosure was unnecessary, however, because
the court held that the missing tape was explicitly included within
those statements discoverable under rule 16 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure. Rule 16(a), providing for discovery of "recorded
statements or confessions made by the defendant," was broadly
construed to encompass the defendant's pre-arrest remarks which
were surreptitiously taped by government agents. Even conceding a
narrow interpretation of 16(a) to cover only formal statements of past
occurrences, the court concluded that, in the alternative, defendants'
statements would be discoverable as a "tangible object" under rule
16(b). Presumably, the court considered rule 16(b)'s requirement of
materiality and reasonableness to be satisfied by the "unavoidable
possibility" that the tape might tend to exculpate the defendants.
33. Karp v. United States, 277 F.2d 843, 848 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 842 (1960);
United States v. O'Conner, 273 F.2d 358, 360-61 (2d Cir. 1959); Holmes v. United States, 271
F.2d 635, 638-39 (4th Cir. 1959); United States v. Prince, 264 F.2d 850, 852 (3d Cir. 1959).
34. Compare United States v. Crisona, 416 F.2d 107, 113-14 (2d Cir. 1969) and United
States v. Birnbaum, 337 F.2d 490, 498 (2d Cir. 1964), with United States v. Sopher, 362 F.2d
523, 525-26 (7th Cir. 1966).
35. - F.2d -. (D.C. Cir. 1971).
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Finally, the court touched upon the possibility that the tape fell within
the scope of the Jencks Act requirement that the defendant be allowed
to inspect all recordings of oral statements made by government
witnesses to government agents which are relevant to the witnesses'
direct testimony. The court, though, refused to decide whether the
statutory language reached Agent Pope's conversation with the
defendants, since the Jencks Act would not have been applicable until
the completion of Agent Pope's direct testimony and the tape already
was held to be discoverable at the pre-trial stage under rule 16.
Upon finding that the prosecution was both constitutionally and
statutorily obligated to produce the tape for the defendant's
inspection, the court still faced the problem of the extent to which the
tape's disappearance mitigated this duty. The court rejected the
prosecution's contention that loss per se would obviate the disclosure
requirement, since disclosure could be avoided simply by destroying
the evidence before prosecution was instigated or before the defense
sought discovery. Rather, the court held that once the Government
has possession of evidence, the duty of disclosure becomes an
obligation to preserve the evidence. Where the evidence is not
preserved, as in the present case, the court concluded that the
imposition of judicial sanctions upon the prosecution should depend
upon the circumstances surrounding the loss., Citing UnitedStates v.
Augenblick37 where the Supreme Court refused to impose sanctions
when the Government lost a tape subject to inspection under the
Jencks Act, the court of appeals concluded that the prosecution must
sustain a heavy burden of explaining any loss of evidence, but that no
sanctions would be imposed if the Government makes a good faith
effort "to follow rigorous and systematic procedures designed to
preserve all discoverable evidence gathered in the course of a criminal
investigation. ' 3 The court suggested that each investigative agency
would be allowed to formulate its own procedural guidelines,
according to what was best suited to its mode of operation; but such
procedure would be subject to judicial scrutiny concerning the
guidelines' effectiveness in preserving evidence. Since no such
guidelines existed at the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs,
the court was forced to reach a disposition of the Bryant case through
a less refined approach. Although concluding that under the
36. 393 at .
37. 393 U.S. 348 (1969).
38.
- F.2"d
at
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circumstances the government agent was negligent in failing to
preserve the tape, the majority rejected the sanction of a new trial.
Since the tape would still be unavailable at a new trial and if Agent
Pope's testimony were stricken from the record for that reason, the
prosecution's case would be destroyed, and a new trial would be
pointless. Unwilling to make the choice between affirming or
dismissing, the majority, indicating that the harsher sanctions would
apply in the future, remanded the case to the district court for further
testimony from the government agents in order to "clarify the degree
of negligence, and the possibility of bad faith" in the handling of the
tapes. 39
The inability of the court to reach a final disposition given the
facts in the record and the remand of the case in an effort to obtain
further findings upon the circumstances of the tape's disappearance
clearly indicate the court's hesitancy summarily to impose judicial
sanctions upon the prosecution, where no bad faith is exhibited in
failing to preserve the tapes. Yet, there is every reason to expect that
these same difficulties involving the preservation of relevant evidence
will be encountered in future cases. In anticipation of this continuing
problem, the court of appeals placed the burden on the Government to
make a good faith effort to preserve all evidence and ordered
investigative agencies to adhere to self-developed guidelines designed
to ensure preservation. Rather than attempting to force all agencies to
abide by one rigid set of guidelines, the court chose the more realistic
and probably more functional approach of allowing each agency to
promulgate guidelines within its own framework of operations. This
ruling placed the agencies on notice that in the future sanctions would
be imposed for the negligent failure to preserve potentially material
evidence; only good faith adherence to effective procedural guidelines
would enable the Government to escape judicial sanctions. For the
purpose of applying the decision in Bryant to future losses of evidence
by government agencies, the cases which will arise conveniently divide
into three basic situations. First, if the agency promulgates and
consistently complies with effective guidelines, but nevertheless, loses
evidence, no sanctions will be imposed, since the agency did all that
Bryant requires. On the other hand, Bryant will just as obviously
dictate the imposition of sanctions in the situation where the agency
which loses evidence has implemented either insufficient guidelines or
no guidelines at all. So long as the circumstances accompanying the
39. Id. at
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agency's loss of evidence approximate one of these two extremes, the
judicial disposition of the cases should be simple. However, the courts
will encounter difficulty in situations which fit neither of the two
extremes provided for in Bryant. Suppose, for example, that while the
agency adopts effective guidelines which it regularly follows, one of its
agents fails to adhere strictly to the guidelines in a particular case and,
either as a result of this laxity, or by coincidence, loses the evidence.
Obviously, the agency's employee was negligent in performing his
duties, and yet it appears that the agency took every foreseeable
precaution to preserve evidence in its possession. Whether the loss of
evidence under such circumstances should summon the imposition of
sanctions is unclear from the Bryant case. Assuming, arguendo, that
sanctions should be invoked against the agency, the court then must
face the additional problem of determining the appropriate sanction.
In a factual situation similar to Bryant, where the testimony of
government agents comprises the basis of the prosecution's case, the
striking of the agents' testimony would be comparable to dismissal of
the charge against the defendant. 4D Furthermore, since this sanction is
actually meted out to the prosecution rather than to the investigative
agency which lost the evidence, its effectiveness in preventing further
losses is questionable. To merely fine the negligent agent, however,
would do nothing to alleviate the harm that the loss of evidence has
caused to the defendant. In reality, there may be no effective solution
to the problem of loss in the situations approximating neither of the
extremes provided for in Bryant. Yet, while Bryant did not solve all
the problems which will confront the courts in future cases involving
loss of evidence, it did provide a procedure which may significantly
reduce the likelihood that such losses will occur.
40. Id. at -

See the pertinent text of 18 U.S.C. § 3500(d), supra note 30.

